



A Survey of WAP Security Architecture

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Overview



- **Security Basics**
- **Wireless Security**
- **WTLS & SSL**
- **WAP Security Models**
- **WIM, WMLScript, Access Control**
- **Summary**
- **References**



Security Basics



- **Security Goals**
 - **Authentication**
 - **Confidentiality**
 - **Integrity**
 - **Authorization**
 - **Non-Repudiation**



Security Basics



- **Cryptography**
 - **Symmetric: 3DES, RC4, etc.**
 - **Asymmetric: RSA, ECC**
- **Key Exchange**
- **Digital Signature**
- **Certificates**
- **PKI**



Wireless Security



- **Link Layer Security**
 - GSM
 - CDMA
 - CDPD
- **Application Layer Security**
 - WAP: WTLS, WML, WMLScript, & SSL
 - iMode: N/A
 - SMS: N/A

Need for App Level Security



- **Bearer Independence**





Figure 4. WAP Architecture

- **Security out to Gateway**
- **Advanced Security Goals (ie. Non-Repudiation)**

Basic WAP Architecture






- **WTLS Goals**
 - **Authentication: Asymmetric Key Crypto**
 - **Class 1: No Authentication**
 - **Class 2: Server Authentication**
 - **Class 3: Mutual Authentication**
 - **Privacy: Symmetric Key Crypto**
 - **Data Integrity: MACs**



WTLS: Class 1



- **No Authentication**






WTLS: Class 2



- **Server-Authentication Only**





• Mutual-Authentication

Client Hello ----->

ServerHello
Certificate
CertificateRequest
ServerHelloDone
<-----

1. Verify Server Certificate

Certificate

ClientKeyExchange (*only for RSA*)

CertificateVerify

ChangeCipherSpec

Finished

3. Generate Signature

----->

<-----

Finished

Application Data

<----->

Application Data



TLS/SSL vs. WTLS



- **WTLS supports ECC**
- **WTLS over WDP**
TLS over TCP
- **Premaster secret is 20 bytes**
(vs. 48 in TLS/SSL)




WAP Security Models



- **Operator Hosts Gateway**
 - Without PKI
 - With PKI
- **Content Provider Hosts Gateway**
 - Static Gateway Connection
 - Dynamic Gateway Connection



- **Without PKI**






Operator Hosts Gateway



- **Without PKI:**
 - **Advantages**
 - No extra work for Content Provider
 - No extra work for user
 - System only requires one logical gateway
 - **Disadvantages**
 - Content Provider must trust Operator (NDA)
 - Operator can control home deck
 - Operator can introduce advertising



- **With PKI**






Operator Hosts Gateway



- **With PKI:**
 - **Advantages**
 - **Content providers does not need to trust Operator.**
 - **Disadvantages**
 - **PKI Infrastructure must be in place.**

- **Static Gateway Connection**






Content Provider Hosts Gateway

- **Static Gateway Connection**
 - **Advantages**
 - Content Provider does not need to trust Operator
 - Content Provider can control home deck
 - OTA can be used to configure mobile terminal
 - **Disadvantages**
 - Mobile terminal may have limited number of gateway config sets (i.e., Nokia 7110 has 10)
 - Mobile Terminal needs to be configured.
 - OTA via WAP Push / SMS may not work with gateway / mobile terminal combination
 - Content Provider may have to pre-configure mobile terminals

- **Dynamic Gateway Connection**





Content Provider Hosts Gateway

- **Dynamic Gateway Connection**
 - **Advantages**
 - Content Provider does not need to trust Operator.
 - Content Provider does not need to worry about mobile terminal config
 - **Disadvantages**
 - Operator needs to trust Content Provider.
 - Not deployed yet.

Restricting Gateway Access



- **Consider the following attack:**
 - Eve runs a “modified” WAP gateway
 - Eve fools a user into using her gateway
- **Now, Eve can eavesdrop on all of the users requests and responses!**

- **To prevent this, check the gateway IP address in the HTTP request.**



WIM: WAP Identity Module



- **WIM must be tamper-resistant**
- **Stores Keys & Master Secrets**
- **Computes crypto operations**
 - “unwrapping master secret”
 - client signature in WTLS Handshake
 - key exchange (ECC WTLS Handshake)
- **Also:**
 - **Generates Keys**
 - **Stores Certificates (or their URLs)**
 - CA & Root Certs
 - User Certs
- **Can be implemented with SIM**



- Non-repudiation
- ***signedString = Crypto.signText
(stringToSign, options, keyIdType, keyId)***

```
var foo = Crypto.signText("Bill of Sale\n-----\n3  
Bolognese $18.00\n1 Pepperoni $7.00\n4 Lemonade $6.00\n---  
-----\nTotal Price $31.00",  
0, 1,  
"\x37\x00\xB6\x96\x37\x75\xE3\x93\x48\x74\xD3\x98\x47\x53\x94\x34\x58\x97\xB5\xD6");  
// The application indicates the signature key
```

- **WIM can store signing key and compute signature**



WML Access Control



- **WML Deck-Level Access Control**
`<wml>`
`<head>`
`<access domain="worldfaq.com" path = "/stats">`
`</head>`
`<card>`
`...`
`</card>`
`</wml>`
- **WMLScript Access Control**
`use access`
`domain domain_name |`
`path path_name |`
`domain domain_name path path_name;`
- `use access domain "worldfaq.com" path "/stats"`



- **Gateway position & configuration allows for different trust models**
- **Security at multiple levels**
 - **Link Layer (depends on bearer)**
 - **App Layer**
 - **Authentication, Confidentiality, and Integrity: WTLS**
 - **Authorization: App-dependent, or WML <access> and WMLScript use access pragma**
 - **Non-Repudiation: WML signText**



- **C. Arehart, N. Chidambaram, S. Guruprasad, et. al. Professional WAP. Wrox Press, 2000. ISBN 1-861004-0-44**
- **D. Margrave, GSM Security and Encryption**
- **WAP-100, Wireless Application Protocol Architecture Specification**
- **WAP-191, Wireless Markup Language Specification**
- **WAP-193, WMLScript Language Specification**
- **WAP-199, Wireless Transport Layer Security Specification**
- **WAP-198, Wireless Identity Module**
- **WAP-161, WMLScript Crypto API Library**
- **WAP-187, WAP Transport Layer E2E Security Specification**
- **WAP-217, WAP Public Key Infrastructure Definition**